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CONNEC TING THE DOTS
Capital Ships, the Littoral, Command of the Sea, and the
World Order
Robert C. Rubel

A

n announcement in 2013 by then–Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel that the
Navy might reduce its aircraft carrier fleet from eleven to eight was an indication not only of harsh budget realities but also of changed operational circumstances at sea.1 In World War II, the aircraft carrier displaced the big-gun battleship as the capital ship. The United States subsequently used its fleet of aircraft
carriers to exercise the command of the sea that it had won in the war to secure
the peace. It stationed them around the periphery of Eurasia, initially to support a
grand strategy of containing the Soviet Union and then, after the Soviet collapse,
to maintain general strategic stability. This use of
aircraft carriers has lasted almost seventy years, a
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will have ripple effects in that ecology. In this article we will explore that ecology
and speculate on how it might change if the capital ship, as a key naval function,
capability, and concept, passes from the scene.
When the aircraft carrier displaced the battleship as the key type of capital
ship, the transition, for all its tactical and operational impact, did not alter the
fundamental character of naval warfare. Decisive offensive power remained
concentrated in a relatively small number of large, expensive combatants. It is
not clear that a large warship of new design is waiting in the wings to replace
the aircraft carrier if indeed it becomes obsolescent. One possibility is that naval
offensive power will reside in various types of missiles that could be widely distributed among a variety of vessels.2 In fact, this process has been under way for
some time in the form of Tomahawk land-attack missiles loaded on destroyers,
cruisers, and submarines. If “missilization” is carried to its logical conclusion,
displacing the carrier and its air wing as the principal offensive power of the fleet,
the nature of naval warfare could change, and that change could have ripple effects in the global geopolitical ecology, one that has been, to this point, generally
favorable to American interests.
This article will not attempt to pass judgment on whether the aircraft carrier
and its embarked tactical air wing are in fact headed for obsolescence, although
there exists just such a debate in the current literature.3 To be clear, and as will
be discussed later, the U.S. Navy might elect to keep some aircraft carriers in
commission even if only in support roles. Also, care must be taken to distinguish
between the “capital ship” as a particular physical object and “capital ship” as a
warfare function. Later, for illustrative purposes, we will explore a world in which
the capital-ship function has been made obsolete by new kinds of weapons and
sensors, whether or not aircraft carriers remain in the inventory.
COMMAND OF THE SEA AND CAPITAL SHIPS
From the galleasses of the Christian armada that prevailed at Lepanto in 1571
to the Gerald Ford–class CVN of today, there has been an intrinsic relationship
between capital ships and command of the sea. Command of the sea, rightly
understood, is simply the strength relationship between two contending navies.4
The one that is sufficiently stronger than the other enjoys freedom of action,
including the ability to move its nation’s army by sea, disperse to protect its commerce, and come to the aid of allies. Such command was traditionally achieved
by winning a decisive sea battle, and the arbiter of such battles since Lepanto has
generally been the capital ship—the largest and strongest ship type afloat, capable
of defeating lesser types. Since 1945 the United States has, by virtue of its eradication of the Imperial Japanese Navy in World War II and thereafter in the absence
of a serious Soviet challenge, enjoyed virtually uncontested command of the sea.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss4/6

NWC_Autumn2015Reivew.indb 47

2

8/13/15 3:06 PM

48

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Rubel: Connecting the Dots: Capital Ships, the Littoral, Command of the

The U.S. Navy’s dominance has been so complete that some writers question
whether the concept has relevance anymore.5 However, a pair of analysts who
traced the history of the concept from the late fifteenth century through the late
twentieth argue that a particular dimension of command of the sea is operative
especially in times of dominance—the leading nation’s ability to use command of
the sea to enforce the rules of the international order according to its interests.6
Throughout this period, this dimension included the ability to regulate commerce but also to project power ashore. A dominant capital-ship fleet either dispersed to support such operations or lurked in the background, dissuading by its
existence any potential challenger from even trying to build a competitive fleet.
In the post–World War II era, the U.S. Navy’s fleet of aircraft carriers has been
employed in this way. In roles ranging from stopgap application of airpower
against an invading North Korean army in 1950 through support of special forces
in the opening moves of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in 2001, to most recently air strikes to limit the advance of Islamic State forces, the Navy’s carriers have
been dispersed around the periphery of Eurasia as a ready tool for the president.
In a 1954 U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings article, Samuel Huntington summed
up the Navy’s postwar situation: “Its purpose now is not to acquire command
of the sea but rather to utilize its command of the sea to achieve supremacy on
land. More specifically, it is to apply naval power to that decisive strip of littoral
encircling the Eurasian continent.”7 The key to the utility of the aircraft carrier
in these roles has been its ability to project power deep inland, taking up station
wherever the situation demanded. The pattern of aircraft-carrier utilization,
combined with deployments and movements to assure allies or deter potential
aggressors, clearly indicates these ships have been dispersed around the world to
exercise American command of the sea.
ANTI–CAPITAL SHIP TECHNOLOGY
Since the latter part of the nineteenth century, a series of technological developments have challenged the dominance of capital ships. The “automotive” (i.e.,
self-propelled) torpedo, the aircraft, the submarine, and the missile have all
presented potentially disruptive challenges. To date, however, the capital ship in
its various forms has survived and retained its utility for seizing, maintaining,
and exercising command of the sea. In World War II, despite some submarine
successes against them, both Japanese and American capital ships, mainly carriers, used speed, maneuver, and offensive reach to neutralize or at least contain
threats. Beyond those at sea, threats emanating from land have always constituted
a mortal danger to capital ships. Admiral Horatio Nelson is supposed to have said
“a ship’s a fool to fight a fort,” referring to the high volume and accuracy of fire
that can be produced by a fort in comparison with what can be generated by a
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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ship. A number of destroyers, cruisers, and even battleships have suffered damage
in duels with shore batteries. In the Pacific War, American carriers before 1944
were careful to remain out of range of Japanese air bases except for covert dashes
into such zones for hit-and-run raids.
The post–World War II world has seen the development of nuclear submarines, long-range shore-based bombers carrying antiship cruise missiles, and,
most recently, land-based intermediate-range ballistic missiles with antiship
seekers.8 Yet in the absence of a shooting war involving these weapons, the aircraft carrier has been able to exercise its command-of-the-sea function virtually
unmolested. A close call occurred in the eastern Mediterranean in 1973 when
U.S. and Soviet fleets intermingled during the Yom Kippur War. The Soviet fleet
was well armed with antiship missiles, and a few nuclear submarines were present.9 The author was a junior attack aviator on board USS Independence (CV 62)
in that crisis and can attest to the precarious situation of the U.S. carriers. While
defensive systems such as Aegis and directed energy have since been developed,
the threats have become more challenging. The danger is that the net outcome of
an offense-versus-defense battle cannot be truly known short of actual fighting.
Thus the ability of aircraft carriers, as capital ships, to carry out the commandof-the-sea mission is increasingly being placed in question.
THE LITTORAL
Many writers and theorists have divided the seas into two parts, the open ocean
and the littoral. Conventional lay wisdom on naval matters links large ships with
the “blue water” of the high seas and smaller craft with the “green water” of the
littoral. In fact, most major naval battles have taken place within the littoral or
at least in the vicinity of land features. Large ships, capital ships not excepted,
are designed to cross oceans and to carry a lot of payload; their purpose is not to
“hang out” in midocean. It is instructive to examine three tacit operational rules
for capital-ship fleets that have remained valid since the seventeenth century:
• Keep the fleet concentrated.
• Do not become decisively engaged with land forces unless decisively superior (a more general rewording of Admiral Nelson’s “A ship’s a fool to fight a
fort”).
• Do not sacrifice the mobility of the fleet by tying it to a geographic feature.10
These rules can be broken if conditions are right, but in the presence of a significant opposing force ignoring them has been a recipe for losing ships. We can
skip over the first rule for the purposes of this article and focus on the second
two. The second rule reflects, as generally noted, the ability of land-based forces
to generate a higher rate of fire—or aircraft sorties—per unit time than can ships;
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss4/6
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a land adversary is also less likely, on a force-wide basis, to suffer disabling damage per hit.
The third rule has to do with detectability. A widely maneuvering fleet is
harder to find and target than one that is forced to remain in the vicinity of an
island or other geographic feature. The distance the littoral effectively extends
seaward can be thought of as the distance out to which these two latter rules
retain their salience. New weapons and new modes of search and surveillance
have extended this effective distance considerably in several regions of the world.
Given the strategic mission of exercising command of the sea through power projection ashore, it really is not useful to talk about U.S. aircraft carrier operations
outside the littoral—anywhere. Where no threats are manifest, carriers disregard
the rules with impunity, operating as airfields at sea.11 Palpable threat levels force
their consideration.
Where the relationship of high sea to the littoral comes into practical effect is
in the design of fleet defensive systems. A carrier strike group (CSG) employs a
layered defense scheme in which fighter aircraft establish an outer ring, reaching
perhaps out to three hundred miles. Inside this fighter-engagement zone, Aegis
destroyers and cruisers employ surface-to-air missiles for area defense. Finally,
the innermost zone consists of various point-defense systems on each ship. This
three-layer scheme is best thought of as a strainer, not a shield. The outer layers
are not likely to destroy all inbound aircraft or missiles in saturation raids. They
are supposed to reduce the number of “leakers” to a number that can be managed
by point-defense systems. To function effectively, the scheme requires distance,
ideally hundreds of miles. A preferred operational case against a land-based
threat would be an “approach battle,” in which the CSG launches long-range air
and missile strikes to disable enemy defenses before they can be brought to bear
effectively on the group. By the time the group enters the littoral, the threat level
would be reduced to the point that the two fleet-employment rules could at least
be bent, if not broken. But political circumstances, such as those encountered in
the eastern Mediterranean in 1973, and long-range shore systems, such as antiship ballistic missiles, not to mention cruise missile–armed submarines, force
the CSG out of its preferred mode and make the consequences of breaking the
rules severe.
The difficult logic of littoral warfare prompted Rear Admiral Yedidia Ya’ari of
the Israel Navy to write twenty years ago, “I argue that when warships designed
for the high seas enter the confined waters of the littoral arena, the fundamental
relationships of maneuverability and firepower are upset,” and “The surface ships
now in commission were designed with the open ocean and distant defensive
perimeters in mind; to keep deploying them to a playing field where, under the
most optimistic assumptions, their survival requires as a normal operating mode
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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the highest level of everything, all the time, is unhealthy and unrealistic in the
long run.”12
The objective here is not to advance an argument against aircraft carriers; it is
to illuminate the relationship among American command of the sea, aircraft carriers as the capital ships that are collectively the instrumentality for its exercise,
a favorable world order based on that command, and the nature of the littoral.
These factors are inextricably intertwined, and changes to one inevitably affect
the others.
CONCENTRATION OF RESOURCES AND RISK
If kinetic threats to the aircraft carrier are latent, the budgetary threat is all too
real. USS Gerald Ford (CVN 78) will cost around thirteen billion dollars. That
figure is for the ship alone; the air wing would add another five to six billion.13
Moreover, the carrier aviation “enterprise” absorbs a significant plurality of U.S.
Navy resources, including personnel and infrastructure. Beyond the absolute
numbers, this investment represents an enormous concentration of assets and
therefore risk. However, it has always been this way with capital ships; they require concentration both in investment and, when there is a contending navy,
in employment. If, through their construction and use, command of the sea is
seized, maintained, and exercised, adequate return on investment is realized.
Assuming that Secretary Hagel was correct and the CVN force will be reduced
below eleven, the Navy faces two strategic problems that involve the connection
between capital ships and command of the sea. The first is one of simple numbers. If the exercise of command is strictly associated with capital ships, what
number of CVNs is the minimum needed? Finding the answer requires assessment of which regions require such exercise and which do not. After the Cold
War, the U.S. Navy all but abandoned carrier deployments from Norway’s North
Cape all the way to the strait of Bab el Mandeb, because there was no further need
for the exercise of command in those waters. As the global system evolves both
politically and economically, the need to exercise command may shrink even
more—or it may expand because of Chinese or Russian adventurism. In the case
of contraction, it may be the case that the CVNs can be retained in home waters,
whereby the justification for investment would decline even further. But even
in the expansion case the ability to increase the number of CVNs may simply
evaporate as their cost escalates and defense budgets contract.14
The other issue is whether the CVN itself is able to continue as a capital ship.
Can it operate at an acceptable degree of risk in waters it needs to enter to carry
out its power-projection function? And indeed, can manned tactical aircraft continue to be viable weapons-delivery vehicles in the face of modern air defenses?
Again, these questions have been addressed elsewhere, and it is not within the
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss4/6
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scope of this article to argue the matter either way. However, we will make the
assumption that sufficient uncertainty exists to warrant thinking about what
American naval posture might be like if the answer, with respect both to carriers
and to their manned aircraft, is judged at some point to be no.
In a more general and abstract sense, there is the question whether concentration in any form is a good idea in an age of cyberspace, ubiquitous sensing,
machine intelligence, precision missiles, and, of course, nuclear weapons. Early
in the nuclear age the Navy developed highly dispersed tactical formations and
spread out its home ports so that one nuclear bomb could not destroy too much.
Over the decades of the 1950s, ’60s, and ’70s, U.S. Sixth Fleet conducted a series
of experiments to determine whether dispersed formations, emission control,
and deceptive maneuvers could be effective in protecting the aircraft carrier from
air and submarine attack. Progressive tactical development over this span of time
produced an array of methods and equipment that appeared to be effective, at
least for a given number of hours or days.15 Nevertheless, combat power was still
concentrated in the carrier, and losing the carrier, through equipment failure or
bad luck, put the fleet substantially out of business. Today, arguments for dispersal rotate around the networking capability of forces and the range of weapons.
That is, given a battle-force network and long-range weapons, ships can be physically dispersed but operate as if they were in close formation. However, this disposition does not change the basic fact that most offensive power is concentrated
in the carrier. Investment bankers urge diversified portfolios. Concentration of
combat capability, like concentration of investment, may constitute strategic vulnerability, if, in the naval case, it has not already done so. But concentration does
produce various efficiencies in both investment and the application of force, so
the incentives to concentrate will always be there.
BREAKING THE LINK BETWEEN COMMAND OF THE SEA AND
CAPITAL SHIPS
Command of the sea as an operative basis for naval decision making has been
around, whether the term has been explicitly used or not, since at least the
Peloponnesian War, when the land power Sparta based its strategies on the
presumption of Athenian predominance at sea. It predates the development of
the capital ship, perhaps offering a basis for delinking the two concepts. Could
command be maintained and exercised with a distributed force of smaller ships?
Capital ships arose to meet the needs of gun and, later, aircraft technology, both
of which required progressively larger hulls and physical concentration to be
effective against “symmetric” forces—that is, adversaries armed essentially like
oneself. It is not clear that missile, mine, or other unmanned technologies require
concentration; they may in fact require the opposite—that is, distribution—to be
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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effective. As a result, distribution of power brings into question the whole idea of
command of the sea as traditionally conceived.
As long as naval power was defined in terms of fleets of capital ships, admirals
shaped their strategies on the basis of how they viewed their strength relative to
that of their enemies. Weaker navies, feeling they would meet defeat in a pitched
naval battle, tried at times to compensate for their deficiencies in capital ships
through the use of distributed small forces to interdict commerce or achieve
some form or degree of denial using raiders, flotillas of small combatants, or
mines against the stronger navy. However, the stronger force, enjoying command, was at liberty to blockade and to conduct amphibious operations directly
against the flanks of the enemy or somewhere that mattered on the periphery.
Using capital-ship power to provide security for such operations has been normal
practice, because it has been effective.
But in today’s emerging operational environment it is not clear that using
capital ships to cover an amphibious landing would be either tactically effective
or strategically wise. An enemy possessing an array of modern missile, cyber,
and unmanned forces might plausibly achieve disabling hits on several capital
ships. If it did, the task force commander would have a difficult decision between
proceeding with reduced security and abandoning the operation. A real-world
example is the Falklands War of 1982. What if the Argentines had put one of the
British carriers out of action? The British commander later admitted that such a
loss would have caused him to cancel the landing of troops.16
The point is that emerging technology appears to give a decisive edge to the
tactical offense at sea—that is, to reinforce the historically normal state of affairs.17 In the early years of the Pacific War, aircraft carriers took advantage of this
condition by attempting to strike effectively first, the paradigm being the battle
of Midway.18 The logic of striking effectively first extends to projecting power
against the shore. One of the criteria for success in the Sixth Fleet experiments on
deception and dispersal was whether carriers remained untargeted long enough
to get in disabling first strikes against enemy airfields.19 The presumption was
that the resulting impairment of enemy strike operations would be sufficient to
reduce the threat to levels manageable by battle group defenses. If initial strikes
cannot be sufficiently disabling, or if the enemy’s offensive power (missiles, say)
is dispersed and hidden, the logic of striking effectively first evaporates, negating
the true value of a capital ship. The capital-ship group or fleet is thus forced to
break the second fleet-employment rule—“Do not become decisively engaged
with land forces unless decisively superior”—and losses can be expected. The
question then becomes whether the operation is worth the loss of one or more
capital ships. Unless the warfare is nuclear or an existential issue is otherwise at
stake, the trade-off is not likely to be advantageous.20
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Capital ships generally should be hazarded only when the potential strategic
gain—command of the sea, national survival, or some other vital interest worth
such risk—is at stake. That said, the U.S. Navy in 1942 twice risked its few available aircraft carriers in the defense of the beachhead at Guadalcanal, and it suffered losses in the process. However, it did so in the knowledge that within a year
Essex-class carriers would start coming off the shipways in numbers. Moreover,
the U.S. carriers were risked only when Japanese carriers were involved. Would
the carriers have been placed in jeopardy had the Japanese dispatched a large
flotilla of submarines and destroyers? The point is that it may not be worthwhile
to employ capital ships even when command of the sea is at risk, as they could be
lost without prospect of meaningful gain.
On the flip side, could distributed and possibly dispersed missile-centric
forces perform the capital-ship function, at least the traditional one of seizing
command of the sea against a similar force? We will explore this question more
shortly, but it appears that distributed, missile-centric warfare obliges navies, the
stronger as well as the weaker, to act as if they did not have command. Thus it is
hard to see how the concept of command of the sea could be delinked from the
function of the capital ship.
A POST–CAPITAL SHIP WORLD
What might happen in a future operational environment in which the seas, or at
least the significant portions of them, become too dangerous for capital ships?21
To envision such a world, we must understand what strategic functions would be
lost. To do that, in turn, we must first recognize that there has been a shift in the
global geopolitical ecology, a shift that has been generated in part by the displacement of the dreadnought by the aircraft carrier and that, reciprocally, has transformed the function of the capital ship. Prior to 1945, the strategic function of
the capital ship was to seize command of the sea by destroying the opposing fleet.
After 1945, following Samuel Huntington’s logic, the carrier’s strategic function
became projecting power ashore. When Huntington wrote, land-attack cruise
missiles were barely embryonic; carrier-based tactical airpower was the principal
weapon of the U.S. Navy, functioning either independently or in support of Marines or other land forces. The carrier’s ability to take station in the near littoral
(that is, close to shore) and function there as an airfield at sea was its key strategic
capability.22 Over the years, Tomahawk cruise missiles have taken over much of
tactical airpower’s deep interdiction and raiding portfolio, but the airfield-atsea function remains the carrier’s irreplaceable core capability. This capability
has made virtually the whole Eurasian littoral accessible by American power, in
whatever form, hard or soft. Loss of the airfield-at-sea capability removes from
the table certain forms of power projection in certain areas.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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Command of the sea confers on its possessor, specifically the United States,
three key strategic benefits: sanctuary for the nation’s war economy, credible and
useful contact with allies, and strategic options in terms of lines of operation.
In addition to breaking, potentially, the sea links with allies, loss of the modern
capital-ship function would narrow the range of strategic options available to the
United States. This restriction would have implications and effects not just in
war but for the dynamics of peacetime competition. Loss of American ability to
intervene in certain areas in certain ways would provide potentially hostile actors
freedom of action locally or regionally that they do not now enjoy. (What, for
instance, would now be the situation in Iraq if carrier aircraft had not conducted
interdiction strikes against Islamic State forces in 2014–15?) Such freedom of
action would increase the chances that the current world order, turbulent as it
is, would deteriorate even more, trending toward worsened anarchy, the rise of
hostile regional hegemons or trade blocs, or other geopolitical pathologies.
If the disputes spawned or exacerbated by this set of adverse trends were to
erupt into war, especially one with a significant naval component, what would
that war look like? Let us assume that the U.S. Navy, as well as virtually all others, will have recognized the shift in conditions and restructured accordingly,
distributing offensive power among submarines, unmanned systems, and smaller
surface combatants. The advantage would still lie with coastal powers that could
build strong antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) systems, but the U.S. Navy would be
more able and willing, owing to the higher risk tolerance of its new force structure, than it might be now to send forces into contested waters, and some A2/
AD systems, such as the antiship ballistic missile, might become obsolete. While
China, for example, might be more able than today to prevent the insertion and
support of U.S. ground forces in-theater, the United States would be more able to
prevent Chinese deployment of ground forces into Taiwan or elsewhere. The East
Asian littoral could become a kind of naval no-man’s-land, a zone in which only
the most stealthy sea-denial forces would be able to operate. Similar situations
might arise in the Persian Gulf and the eastern Mediterranean.
Would command of the sea have any meaning in those conditions? Certain
traditional elements of command would indeed evaporate in some way. Navies—
such as they would be—would operate dispersed not only tactically but also,
perhaps, at the operational and strategic levels, depending on what an opponent
did. Dispersal to avoid being found is an old tactic, but flotillas of smaller ships
might need to be brought together if the enemy forces concentrated. (The German U-boat wolf-pack tactic was, in this sense, the logical response to Allied
convoys.) But in this potential world, one could never be sure where the enemy
might show up, especially one whose offensive power was contained on board
submarines. Strategic dispersal as a benefit of command of the sea thus becomes
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss4/6
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problematic: How does one know when one has command? More than likely, a
prolonged and dispersed attrition fight would be required, during which the risks
of moving ground forces by sea might be unacceptable. At what point would a
supreme commander feel comfortable in dispatching an invasion force?
One possible tenet of future naval warfare (if it is not already true) would be
that if a vessel or force can be found and identified, it can, and most likely will,
be hit. On this basis the naval war becomes a fight for information superiority. In
the 1942 carrier battles, finding first meant striking first, which tended to put a
quick end to each battle, since offensive power was concentrated in a few carrier
decks. In the future, victories would be tactical and incremental, because offensive power would be distributed and hidden. Information superiority would thus
be episodic and require constant effort, the balance perhaps swinging daily. The
oceans would thus become an arena for one big, long, sea-denial fight.
An aspect of command of the sea that would be problematic on both sides of
the equation would be sea commerce. Whereas German U-boats and American
submarines in World War II could prey on shipping with confidence that hitting
what they were shooting at would hurt the enemy, today no such confidence
is possible, because of the convoluted web of ownership of ships and cargoes.
Moreover, oil changes hands on the spot market while it is at sea on tankers, and
the container shipping system has assumed a hub-and-spoke structure in which
the bulk of containers carry subcomponents for products.23 All this means that in
the current shipping regime seizing or sinking merchant vessels may hurt oneself
and one’s allies as easily as the enemy, regardless of the flag of a ship attacked. In
fact, perhaps the only viable form of physical sea-commerce interdiction would
be a close blockade based on a form of unrestricted submarine warfare or mining. However, whether or not commerce interdiction will be feasible in such a
world, command of the sea would not be an issue either way. The old Mahanian
prescription of driving the enemy’s flag from the sea except as a fugitive appears
to be increasingly irrelevant; ships of all types would either be fugitives or be left
unmolested, whosever “side” they were on. It is possible to envision some kind of
“limited” naval war in which each side hunts the other’s naval units but by tacit
mutual agreement allows commercial traffic to continue.24
At this point it would appear that doing away with the capital ship does not
simply break the link between the two concepts but invalidates the concept of
command of the sea. But to penetrate to the most central issue, does asymmetry
in strength continue to matter? If naval strength is a function of how much you
can build and how well you can use it, logic says that a weaker party would seek
to avoid a pitched fight at sea. Yet the dynamics of naval warfare in a non–capital
ship environment may allow weaker powers to challenge the stronger in ways
not possible when capital ships were dominant. Even in a capital-ship regime,
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there are operational options for a weaker navy, including maintaining a fleet-inbeing, raiding commerce, and mounting local denial and disruption operations.
This last option might be expanded beyond the local context as missile ranges
increase, nuclear submarines proliferate, and missiles, mines, and unmanned
systems begin to be hidden on merchant vessels or sown from submarines or
aircraft. Such a dynamic can really be only about disruption, but that might be
enough—for both the weaker and stronger power. What would be gone is the
freedom of action that command of the sea traditionally provided.
However, a complicating (or perhaps mitigating) factor in this scenario is the
issue of sanctuary. None of the three operational options just mentioned for a
weaker navy are viable without some sort of sanctuary, be it a secure base of operations (either defended or hidden) or covertness in deployment, approach, and
attack. In the emerging naval warfare environment such sanctuary is increasingly
problematic, especially secure basing. Submarines armed with land-attack cruise
missiles or land-based ballistic missiles of sufficient range could neutralize or
disrupt almost any naval base, not to mention logistics ships. Even underground
submarine shelters are not immune.
Forces that are significantly weaker than their opponents frequently resort to
the disruptive form of warfare, normally manifested on land as guerrilla warfare.25 Three factors must exist if disruptive warfare (which is usually prolonged
and cumulative) is to be viable: sanctuary, a sustainable tactical mechanism, and
strategic resilience—that is, the ability to keep going despite losses and without
clear evidence of progress toward victory. In the Battle of the Atlantic of World
War II the German submarine force came close to achieving all three; the Allies finally tilted the balance of victory in their own favor by making the U-boat
tactical mechanism unsustainable. They did so by adopting the convoy, forcing
the U-boats to go to where the escorts were, and inflicting enough attrition to
prevent the German navy from keeping enough boats at sea to generate the level
of merchant sinkings needed to ruin the British war economy.
In the future, non–capital ship naval warfare might evolve to the point that
both sides operate as if they were the weaker and both adopt disruptive warfare.
The fight would be very much a distributed, tactical, cat-and-mouse game characterized by incremental attrition, one in which neither side has a clear idea of
which way the balance is tilting. Of course, no such form of warfare would exist
without a cyber dimension or, at least on the U.S. side, long-range bombers being
brought into play. These latter elements would likely spawn, sooner or later, conventionally armed ballistic-missile salvos. Whether or when mushroom clouds
would appear is not knowable, but this extended warfare dynamic might make
their appearance more likely.
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In fact, nuclear weapons represent yet another issue that could decisively affect the future naval warfare environment. Beyond their direct effects on a naval
operation, the issue of whether a war at sea might precipitate an intercontinental
nuclear exchange is increasingly relevant as nuclear weapons and long-range
ballistic-missile technology proliferate. This is not the place for an in-depth
analysis of the question, but we must at least consider whether a naval war devoid
of capital ships, a war that is likely to be more prolonged and cumulative than
in the past, would be more likely or less to be consummated without the use of
nuclear weapons. War games at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island,
during the late 1970s and early 1980s indicated, contrary to the existing opinion
of the time, that a conventional war with the Soviet Union, even with a robust
naval component, would not necessarily escalate into a nuclear exchange.26 At
the time, the Soviet Union had little in the way of capital ships in its navy, but
the U.S. Navy, of course, was flush with aircraft carriers, a number of which were
lost in the games until the American players got savvier about using them. The
only speculation that can be made at this point is that in a “new age” naval war
(by definition, one between major powers) that dragged on for a considerable
time—like, say, the Battle of the Atlantic—there would be more opportunity for
escalation to occur, but it would not be a foregone conclusion.
What does appear to be the case is that in such a world the United States
would have a much harder time even than it does now providing support and
security for an ordered global system. Prevention of the emergence of a Eurasian hegemon might have to be based on a threat of bombardment, nuclear or
conventional. Limited wars on the periphery would be more risky, especially if a
competing naval power—a resurgent Russia, for example—objected. Commerce
might continue, but if it did, systemic disorder or bloc building on the Eurasian
or African continent might promote retrenchment of national business interests
and produce a massive global economic downturn.
CHOICES
The vision that has been presented—one of increased global turbulence and perhaps prolonged and indecisive missile raids, commerce warfare, and slow-motion
escalation—is not very encouraging, but it would seem to follow from the loss
of the strategic airfield-at-sea function and the logic of distributed naval missile
warfare. The thought experiment we have just conducted examines the edges of
the envelope and does not presume to be predictive. Nonetheless, in a scenario
like the one at which we have looked in which capital ships become obsolete,
what options does the United States have?
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Go “All In” to Keep the Capital-Ship Function Viable. To maintain the capital-ship
function, the United States would invest as necessary to keep the CVN viable as
a floating airfield. Directed-energy weapons, radio-frequency obscurants, better
electronic warfare, and a host of other things might add up to an acceptable level
of protection. Additionally, improvements to tactical aircraft survivability or a
shift to unmanned aviation would be required. However, all will be an expensive
proposition, even if it works, and could well curtail other programs and so mean
a significantly smaller fleet. That might in turn require the Navy to change its
forward-presence strategy, perhaps to something approaching a “surge” posture.
Create a “Bimodal” Fleet. Embedded in the development of the 2007 national
maritime strategy was a bimodal fleet concept created by Captain Wayne Hughes,
U.S. Navy (Ret.), of the Naval Postgraduate School, in Monterey, California.27 In
his vision the Navy, acknowledging the increasing threat to carriers, creates regional flotillas that conduct routine “presence” cruises and in war attempt to create
safe operating space in the littoral into which the carriers can subsequently move.
The carriers themselves, while they might still conduct peacetime presence and
low-threat operations, in the event of war would seek refuge in the open ocean,
perhaps providing distant support for regional flotillas, until enemy A2/AD
capabilities had been sufficiently neutralized. The Navy might well have to reduce
the number of carriers to afford this option, taking them off center stage as the
key presence platform.
Preemptive Transformation. Here the Navy would either mothball its carriers or
maintain only a few as support vessels, as was done with the Iowa-class battleships. Its key striking power would reside in large numbers of missiles housed
in a wide variety of numerous platforms. The Navy would compensate for the
loss of the airfield-at-sea function as best it could with unmanned systems and
long-range land-based aircraft. Depending on budgets, the Navy might be able to
support a larger fleet (in fact, that would be a necessary element of this option)
and thus in some ways enhance its forward-presence posture. The risk would be
that without mobile tactical airpower from the sea, that presence might not be as
effective.
Debates on the future of the aircraft carrier tend to focus on technical and tactical issues and thereby to beg a number of important strategic questions. This
article has attempted to connect some strategic dots: the capital-ship function,
command of the sea, the littoral, and the world order. Doing so illuminates the
true relevance of the aircraft carrier, creating a basis for devising and judging
options in case the carrier becomes obsolescent. One set of options has been
presented, but many more perspectives are possible. While carrier obsolescence
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is not a foregone conclusion, it is clear that the geopolitical competitors of the
United States are seeking ways to nullify the American capability to influence and
intervene that the carrier confers. Understanding the linkages helps us refine and
enhance the debate about what to do.
We cannot simply wish away the problem of potential obsolescence or argue
by assertion. If emergent antiaccess/area-denial technology does not do the trick,
escalating construction costs coupled with shrinking defense budgets might. We
have to recognize that the aircraft carrier is not just another warship or defense
program. It is the current capital ship and as such has an intimate relationship
with the modern geopolitical terrain—we might even consider the CVN a geopolitical terrain feature in itself. It is intimately connected also with the world order
that the United States has expended so much blood, effort, and taxpayer money
to create and that has been so congenial to American values and interests. The
various sides in the current debate, both “pro-carrier” and “con,” should take this
factor into account.
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